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Abstract
One of the main challenges faced by the multi-agent community is to ensure the coordination
of autonomous agents in open heterogeneous multi-agent systems. In order to coordinate their
behaviour, the agents should be able to interact with each other. Social commitments have been
used in recent years as an answer to the challenges of enabling heterogeneous agents to communicate
and interact successfully. However, coordinating agents only by means of interaction models is
diﬃcult in open multi-agent systems, where possibly malevolent agents can enter at any time and
violate the interaction rules. Agent organizations, institutions and normative systems have been
used to control the way agents interact and behave. In this paper we try to bring together the
two models of coordinating agents: commitment-based interaction and organizations. To this aim
we describe how one can use social commitments to represent the expected behaviour of an agent
playing a role in an organization. We thus make a ﬁrst step towards a uniﬁed model of coordination
in multi-agent systems: a deﬁnition of the expected behaviour of an agent using social commitments
in both organizational and non-organizational contexts.
Keywords: agent organizations, social commitments
1 Introduction
Agent coordination in open and heterogeneous systems is one of the main chal-
lenges faced by the research in the area of multi-agent systems. In an open and
heterogeneous system, autonomous agents, potentially diﬀerent, can enter and
exit at any time. It is thus very diﬃcult for the system’s designer to specify
what is the system’s desired behaviour without making any assumptions on
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the agents’ internal model. Moreover, agents’ obedience to the system’s co-
ordination mechanisms cannot be taken for granted. Due to their autonomy,
the agents can disobey the coordination mechanisms imposed to them.
In order to coordinate their activities, agents should be able to interact
with each other. An interactional and communicational model that makes no
assumptions on the agents’ internal model has gained more and more adepts
in recent years: social commitments. One of the most known uses of social
commitments is as a new approach on agent communication languages: Dialog
Games [15][16] represent an example of this utilization of social commitments.
However, besides agent communication, social commitments have been used
to provide a generic approach to agent interactions [19].
Agent coordination based only on agent interactions is diﬃcult to achieve.
One of the reasons is the potential presence of malevolent agents that violate
their commitments towards other agents. The system’s designer should take
measures against this possibility by specifying the expected behaviour of an
agent and by imposing sanctions for deviating from this behaviour. Agent
organizations, norms and/or institutions are the solutions used by the multi-
agent community to answer this problem. There are many models and deﬁni-
tions proposed in related work for these terms, ranging from interaction-based
ones [22] to norm-based ones [13]. Among the existing forms of organizations,
we can cite here agent institutions [9], teams [21] or normative societies [1].
We hold the belief that the two coordination approaches, the one based on
social commitments and the organizational one, can be brought together in
an uniﬁed model of coordination in multi-agent systems. This paper presents
a ﬁrst step towards this model: how the expected behaviour of an agent
playing a role in an organization can be described using social commitments.
We are thus able to deﬁne roles and organizational structures using social
commitments, which could be useful for both the agent and the organization.
An agent could use the same model (social commitments) to represent its
communications and interactions with other agents and its expected behaviour
when playing a role. Because this model makes explicit the violation of a
commitment, an organization could use it too, to easily detect autonomous
agents and sanction them accordingly.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the founda-
tions of our work: the social commitment model we use (deﬁnitions, operations
with commitments and social policies). We then show how these notions are
used to deﬁne roles and organizational structures (Section 3). In Section 4 we
discuss the utility of our approach from the point of view of both the agents
and the organization and we describe how a commitment-based multi-agent
organization could be designed. We then present a case study that illustrates
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our model (Section 5) and we discuss some related approaches (Section 6). In
the ﬁnal section we draw some concluding remarks and we trace directions for
future work.
2 Foundations
There are several attempts in related work to deﬁne social commitments, to
identify their life cycle and to propose means to enforce their fulﬁllment, e.g.,
[3], [17] or [20]. The objective of this paper is not to propose a new model
of social commitments, but to present another utilization of them: deﬁning
agent organizations. Towards this aim, we build our work on existing work
on social commitments. In this section, we describe the deﬁnition of and the
operations with social commitments that we use.
2.1 Social commitments
In this paper we use the notion of social commitment to analyze agent or-
ganizations. Before going further, we would like to point out that there are
diﬀerent types of commitments: individual, collective or social [3]. The ﬁrst
two are similar to intentions in the BDI model: the intentions of an agent or
of a group [10]. Social commitments are relational: an agent is committed
towards another to do something. Intuitively, social commitments are similar,
although not identical, to the notion of contract [2].
There are several deﬁnitions and formalisms proposed to represent social
commitments, for example the ones from [3], [17] or [20]. As most of these
approaches, we deﬁne a social commitment (SComm) as a predicate. In this
paper we use the predicate logic to represent formally the notions introduced.
We are not interested here in using this formalism to prove properties of our
model, but only to describe this model in a clear manner.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A social commitment is represented as a predicate:
SComm(id, debtor, creditor, IA, object, status, condition)
When a social commitment is formed, the debtor agent commits itself to-
wards the creditor to fulﬁll the commitment’s object. The creditor can be
another agent or a collective (e.g., a group), as we will see later. Each com-
mitment is uniquely identiﬁed in a system by its id. To simplify our formulae,
in the remainder we will not use the id when representing commitments.
IA stands for institutional agent and its characteristics will be deﬁned in
Section 4. Intuitively, it represents what Castelfranchi calls the witness of
the commitment [3]. It is however more close to the commitment’s context of
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Singh [20]: the organization in which the commitment is formed and which en-
sures its fulﬁllment. It represents the institution responsible of commitments’
enforcement, which contains police agents that detect commitment violations
and agents that sanction them. Thus, in our model, the IA contains the two
sanction parameters of a commitment proposed by Pasquier [17].
The object of a commitment can be an action to be performed, a goal to
be achieved, a condition to be fulﬁlled, etc. We generalize this and we repre-
sent the object of a commitment as a TAEMS-like task [14] to be done. We
chose to use the TAEMS formalism because of its generality and because it
can be easily extend to cope with a variety of task types. For reasons that will
become clear later, we need to group tasks in sets depending on their charac-
teristics. We thus use the concept of task type, which is domain-dependent and
which represents a subset of tasks having common characteristics. Although
each TAEMS task has associated a duration and a deadline, we decided to
follow the example of [17] to specify the deadline of a commitment too. The
condition ﬁeld of a social commitment represents the condition(s) that must
be true for the commitment to be active. Often, these conditions are in terms
of a deadline, i.e., the current time must be before the deadline, otherwise
the commitment is no longer active. However, diﬀerent conditions can be
envisaged, e.g., a commitment is active as long as an agent plays a role.
The status ﬁeld represents one of the states in which a commitment can
be ([17]): inactive, active, violated, fulﬁlled or cancelled. Once created, a
commitment is active as long as its conditions are valid. If the conditions
are no longer valid and will never be again (e.g., a deadline that has passed)
and the debtor has not done the commitment’s object, then the commitment
becomes violated. If, however, the task-object is done within the deadline,
then the commitment is fulﬁlled. Finally, the creditor (in some models the
debtor too) can cancel a commitment. Several commitment operations can
be deﬁned, operations that have as eﬀect the status change of a commitment.
Note that it is the responsibility of the IA to validate the status changes of a
commitment and to take the appropriate measures.
2.2 Operations with commitments and social policies
The social commitments formed in a system are stored in one or more com-
mitment stores [19]. Each Institutional Agent is responsible of a commitment
store that contains all the commitments for which it plays the role of witness
and enforcer. The role of the IA is to validate the changes in the commitments’
status and to take appropriate measures when these changes occur. Agents
manipulate commitments by using operations that modify their status. An
example of such operation is the commitment creation. This operation is per-
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formed by an agent that becomes the debtor of the commitment. A social
commitment is created (with the status active) and stored in a commitment
store by the IA only if its creditor agrees to it too. The operation of cancel-
lation of a commitment can be performed by the creditor of the commitment
and its result is that the IA modiﬁes the commitment’s status to cancelled.
The IA constantly monitors the activities in the system and updates the status
of commitments to violated or fulﬁlled if it is the case.
As we will see in the following section, the most relevant operation from
the point of view of agent organizations is the creation of a commitment. The
agent interaction with the aim of creating commitments can be represented
in diﬀerent ways, e.g., using a request performative in a FIPA-like protocol or
as result of commitment-based dialog games. In this paper we consider the
agent communication with the aim to create a social commitment as a unitary
operation named request. We follow the example of [20] and we use predicates
to represent the names of the commitment operations.
Deﬁnition 2.2 The following predicates denote that an agent performs an
operation to create or to request the creation of a commitment:
create(x, sc(x, y, obj))
request(y, x, sc(x, y, obj))
In order to keep our formulae simple, we use a special predicate to denote the
relevant ﬁelds of a social commitment. Thus, the predicate sc(debtor, creditor,
object) represents all social commitments that have the respective ﬁelds set to
the same values:
sc(x, y, obj) ≡ ∀id∀IA∀st∀cond SComm(id, x, y, IA, obj, st, cond)
Note that due to agents’ autonomy, a request to create a social commit-
ment is not always followed by the creation of that commitment. Moreover,
commitments can also be created proactively by agents, without receiving a
request. Singh [20] introduces the notion of social policy that represents a
meta-commitment, i.e., a commitment that has as object an expression con-
taining a commitment. In this paper we are interested in a special social policy,
the commitment creation policy, that speciﬁes what is the possible answer to
such a request.
Deﬁnition 2.3 A social policy is a meta-commitment:
SPolicy(x, y, IA, ∀z ∈A ∀obj ∈ TTi: request(z, x, sc(x, z, obj)) ⇒
create(x, sc(x, z, obj)), status, condition)
We denote by A the set of all agents, by T the set of all tasks and by
TTi subsets of tasks that correspond to speciﬁc task types. The deﬁnition
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above speciﬁes that an agents x commit towards an agent y in front of an
institutional agent IA to do this policy, i.e., to obey all requests from other
agents, which means the policy above is a very restrictive social policy. In
the next section we will give several examples of how diﬀerent, less-restrictive,
forms of this policy can be used to deﬁne organizational structures.
3 Deﬁning agent organizations using social commitments
Agent organizations are social structures and patterns of agent interaction
imposed to agents to ensure a coherent global behaviour. While the high
number of organizational models proposed in related work (e.g., [12] or [13])
makes it diﬃcult to generalize, we believe that the key notions used in deﬁning
them are the role an agent plays and the norms imposed to this role. To enable
agents to understand the organization they belong to, one must describe the
constraints that playing a role imposes on the behaviour of an agent. For
example, what an agent should do when playing a role (obligations), what it
may and may not do (permissions/prohibitions), what are the relations with
other roles belonging to a group (hierarchy), and how playing a role inﬂuences
the agent’s own goals. In this section we will show how social commitments
can be used to deﬁne these constraints.
We can classify the constraints imposed to an agent playing a role in an
organization into several categories:
• goals to achieve: when it accepts to play a role, an agent accepts to try to
achieve several goals, the role’s goals.
• context-dependent obligations: when playing a role, an agent might have
several obligations towards the organizations, depending on the context.
• authority relations: a role can have authority over another role.
• permissions and prohibitions: when it accepts to play a role, an agent re-
ceives permissions to do some tasks and prohibitions to do others.
In the following we will show how the ﬁrst three types of constraints can
be expressed using social commitments or policies.
3.1 Role goals
The description of a role usually contains the goals that must be achieved by
an agent playing that role. Because we do not want to make any assumptions
on the agent’s internal model, we do not express these characteristics of a
role as goals, but as social commitments. In order to understand what it is
expected to do when playing a role, an agent must understand for what it is
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socially committed. It can then translate these commitments into whatever
notion it uses in its internal reasoning (e.g., goals, intentions).
Deﬁnition 3.1 The role goal commitment has the form:
SComm(x,OA, IA, object, status, x : R)
We denote by x : R the fact that an agent x plays a role R. The agent
is committed towards the organization in which it plays the role and the
commitment is valid as long as it plays the role. To be consistent with the
existing deﬁnitions of social commitments, we say the agent is committed
towards another agent that represents the organization and we note here by
OA. Often the organizational and the institutional agents are the same (OA ≡
IA), but this is not always the case.
3.2 Context-dependent obligations
It is likely that there are obligations for an agent playing a role in an organiza-
tion to do certain tasks. However, these obligations can be context-dependent,
i.e., they are not active all the time, but only in speciﬁc contexts. For example,
it is often impossible to specify a priori when a task must be executed, but
only that it should be executed when certain conditions are fulﬁlled. In other
words, we do not say that there is a social commitment of an agent towards
the organization to do a task, but a social policy specifying the conditions of
creation of such a commitment: a role obligations policy. In real-world orga-
nizations it is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to express all the possible objects
of obligations. This is where our concept of task type comes in handle. We
do not deﬁne obligations for all tasks or for each individual task, but for task
types. This is not a novel idea: Castelfranchi [3] uses the notion of generic
commitments to describe commitments formed for a speciﬁc type of objects
and not for only one object.
Deﬁnition 3.2 The role obligation policy has the form:
SPolicy(x,OA, IA, ∀obj ∈ TTi: request(OA, x, sc(x,OA, obj))⇒
create(x, sc(x,OA, obj)), status, x : R)
3.3 Authority relations
It is diﬃcult to express from the beginning all the goals that must be achieved
by a role in an organization. This is one of the reasons for the utilization
of hierarchies of roles or authority relations between these roles. We say
that a role has authority over another and by this we mean that whenever
the ”superior” role delegates a task to the ”inferior”, the latter adopts that
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task. The authority relations can be expressed as meta-commitments, more
precisely as a special commitment creation policy, the role authority policy,
which is similar to the role obligation policy.
Deﬁnition 3.3 The authority a role R2 has over a role R1 for the tasks of
type TTi is expressed as a role authority policy:
SPolicy(x,OA, IA, ∀y : R2∀obj ∈ TTi: request(y, x, sc(x, y, obj)) ⇒
create(x, sc(x, y, obj)), status, x : R1)
When an agent x plays a role, it adopts the social policies that deﬁne the
authority relationships with other roles. These policies specify that an agent
forms social commitments when it receives justiﬁed requests, i.e., requests from
agents playing roles with authority over its role. In this situation, the predicate
request denotes a request that counts as a request made by a role, and not a
personal request made by an agent. If needed, the diﬀerence between the two
types of request can be underlined by using diﬀerent predicates. Using our
model, the authority a role has over another can be reduced to the obligation
of a role to obey the requests coming from another, or vice versa. However, we
believe it is important to keep a distinction between two diﬀerent concepts:
the hierarchical structures of roles and the norms imposed to them.
3.4 Deﬁning roles and organizational structures using social commitments
In the previous sections we showed how one can use diﬀerent types of social
commitments and policies to deﬁne the expected behaviour of a role. However,
something is still missing: a role cannot be deﬁned only by the social commit-
ments it has, but also by its deontic permissions and prohibitions. When an
agent plays a role, it must gain access to some resources in order to fulﬁll the
social commitments that come with its role. This access comes in two forms:
either physical (the agent receives resources) or deontic (the agent receives the
permission to use the resources or to execute actions). Usually, the deﬁnition
of an organization speciﬁes that everything that is not explicitly permitted is
prohibited, or the other way around. In the deﬁnition below we specify the set
of permissions given to an agent playing a role, a similar deﬁnition is obtained
by specifying the set of prohibitions:
Deﬁnition 3.4 A role can be deﬁned as a 6-tuple:
Role =< name,Res, Perm,RGComm,RAPol, ROPol >
where:
• name is the identiﬁer of the role
• Res is the set of resources (tasks) received by an agent that plays the role
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• Perm is the set of tasks for which an agent receives permissions when playing
the role
• RGComm is the set of role goal commitments associated with the role
• RAPol is the set of role authority policies for which the role is either the
debtor or the beneﬁciary
• ROPol is the set of role obligation policies associated with the role.
We can now specify what it is generally called an organizational structure
as a collection of roles deﬁned as above. It contains both the hierarchy of roles
and the norms regulating the agents’ behaviour, everything being deﬁned using
only one concept: social commitments. The biggest advantage of using this
approach to deﬁne organizational structures is that it makes no assumptions
on the agents’ internal model, which makes it suitable to be used in open
heterogeneous systems. In order to understand the organization it belongs to
and the constraints imposed on its behaviour by the role it plays, an agent
must simply be able to understand the social commitments (and policies).
We deﬁned a role as a collection of diﬀerent types of social (meta-)commit-
ments. These commitments apply to an agent that plays a role (noted x : R).
We can specify what it means that an agent plays a role using the same notion
of social commitment. An agent plays a role in an organization when it forms
the commitment towards the organization to play that role.
Deﬁnition 3.5 A role commitment (RoleComm) has the form:
x : R ≡ RoleComm(x,OA, IA, rolename, active, true)
When this commitment becomes active, i.e., the agent plays the role, all
the commitments and policies that deﬁne the role become also active. The
expression x : R is true as long as this commitment has the status active.
This commitment has the condition of validity set to true, meaning that as
long as it is not explicitly cancelled, it is always active. When the agent no
longer plays the role, the commitment is cancelled and thus the expression
x : R becomes false.
4 Commitment-based agent organizations
In the previous section we proposed a commitment-based representation of
organizational constraints imposed to agents. We believe that both the agents
and the organization could beneﬁt from this representation. In this section
we show how reasoning using social commitments can improve the decision-
making of the agents and the global behaviour of the system and we propose
an architecture for a commitment-based multi-agent system.
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4.1 Reasoning using social commitments and policies
When an agent plays a role, it is committed towards the organization to
behave in a speciﬁc way, and this expected behaviour is described using social
commitments and social policies. The social commitments represent explicitly
what an agent should do, e.g., the goals an agent should achieve because it
plays a role. The social policies describe the context in which an agent should
create such commitments, i.e., the expected behavior of an agent in a given
context. Hence, these commitments and policies impose some limitations to
an agent that plays a role. The social commitments limit the behaviour of an
agent, while the social policies limit the decision-making of an agent.
An agent beneﬁts from an explicit representation of its expected behaviour,
such as a representation using social commitments. By using social commit-
ments, an agent can represent not only what it is expected to do, but also the
sanctions imposed by the institutional agent if its behaviour diﬀers. A social
commitment might be in diﬀerent states and diﬀerent sanctions, positive or
negative, might be assigned for these states. Therefore, an agent can easily
identify what tasks it should do and what are the consequences of it fulﬁlling
or failing to fulﬁll the tasks. Due to their autonomy, the agents can decide
whether to violate or not their commitments, but this representation allows
them to evaluate the consequences of their decisions.
The social policies are an explicit representation of the conditions in which
an agent becomes committed. They have a direct impact on an agent’s
decision-making because they specify what is the expected decision of an agent
in a given context. Therefore, social policies give to an agent an idea about
how constrained will be its behavior when playing a role, i.e., how many
decisions are imposed by the organization. By reasoning in terms of social
commitments and policies, an agent could decide for example whether playing
a role is beneﬁc for it or not. For example, if the agent considers its decision-
making and behaviour will be too constrained with respect to the resources
and permissions it gains, it might decide to not play the role.
We believe this organization-aware social reasoning described above is an
important asset to agents in open MAS. In these systems an agent might enter
a new organization in which it has to choose a role to play. The agent should be
able to evaluate the consequences that playing a role will have on its decision-
making, on its ability to satisfy its goals or on its autonomy. While this
reasoning is still an open research issue, we believe that social commitments
and policies are a suitable tool to use, as they make explicit the limitations
that will be imposed on the agent’s decision-making or behavior.
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4.2 Commitment violation
Due to their autonomy, agents might violate the obligations they have be-
cause they play roles in organizations and they are thus considered to be
norm-autonomous [7]. These norm-autonomous agents introduce a degree of
non-determinism in the system because their behaviour might diﬀer from the
expected one. This is the reason why organizational and institutional ap-
proaches try to limit and punish norm-autonomy. By making explicit what
the agents should do using social commitments and policies, we facilitate this
task: norm-autonomy is detected when changes occur in the commitments’
status. However, before discussing how commitments’ status is changed and
this change sanctioned, we ﬁrst discuss the conceptual diﬀerences between
norm and commitment violation.
We share the point of view of other authors [5] who consider that some
norm violations can be beneﬁc for the system and thus should not be pun-
ished. As this situation is application-dependent, we will not consider it here.
However, even if the norm violation is considered dangerous for the system
and should be punished, there is a diﬀerence between intentional and non-
intentional violation. For example, we cannot really call a norm violation the
case of an agent that tries to fulﬁll a norm and fails because of the unpre-
dictable environment or the lack of help from other agents. This is where the
diﬀerence we make between social policies and social commitments is helpful.
A social policy states that in a given situation an agent should commit to
do a task. An agent violates this policy when it refuses to commit itself to
do that task, i.e., when it declares it does not have the intention to obey the
norm. If the agent creates that commitment, it states that it will try to fulﬁll
the norm (execute the task). However, for diﬀerent reasons, it might fail and
thus its social commitment becomes violated. It is the job of the organization,
represented by the institutional agent, to evaluate whether the commitment
violation was deliberate (and thus we talk about norm violation) or accidental
and in this case maybe no sanction will be imposed.
4.3 Institutional agent
The role of the Institutional Agent in our social commitment deﬁnition is
the role of a witness and enforcer of the commitment. We call this agent
institutional because it encapsulates many of the coordination mechanisms
present in related work on agent institutions ([9] or [22]). In our approach,
this agent should:
• detect the change of status of a commitment (violated, fulﬁlled, cancelled)
• choose the appropriate sanction (positive - reward or negative - penalty)
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• impose this sanction to the agents, i.e., makes sure that the appropriate
agent receives its reward or pays its penalty
We will describe in the following section how we envisage the IA will de-
tect the status change of commitments. Choosing the appropriate sanction
is clearly application-dependent and represents the choice of the system’s de-
signer. As a possible approach, we cite here the ontology of sanctions used in
human societies described in [17]. The authors also propose to use the hypoth-
esis of strict liability : an agent that violates a social commitment pays a sum
equivalent with the value of the task it was committed for. This hypothesis
does not state only how the sanction to be used is chosen, but also that the
agent that violated the commitment pays the sanction.
This is a very strong hypothesis, in the sense that in general we cannot
assume that an agent will willingly pay the sanction imposed to it for a norm
violation. Autonomous agents that violate norms can also decide not to pay
the sanctions. To solve this problem, both the authors of [9] and [17] propose
that an agent must include a special component. This component manages
the social commitments of an agent and whenever a commitment is violated,
the associated sanction is applied (internally), thus ensuring the agent pays
it. It seems that up-to-date this is the best solution to the problem of im-
posing sanctions to autonomous agents, but other solutions can be envisaged
too. For example, the sanctions can be in the form of a decrease in repu-
tation [4]. As their reputation is a notion distributed among other agents,
the violating agents cannot refuse the sanction. Another solution is to use a
model of cascade-commitments. When a social commitment is violated, an-
other commitment is automatically activated to pay the associated sanction.
If this second commitment is violated, another one is automatically created
to pay a higher sanction. This goes on until a commitment that has an as-
sociated sanction of removing the violating agent from the system. We use
this cascade-commitment approach in our design or organizations based on
social-commitments.
4.4 Commitment-based multi-agent systems
A multi-agent system in which the agent interactions are based on social com-
mitments should contain at least one commitment store in which these com-
mitments are stored. The same is true in the case of agent organizations in
which the roles are represented using our commitment-based approach. In
order to function, such an organization needs a commitment store managed
by the Institutional Agent. This commitment store will contain all the social
commitments and policies created by the agents belonging to the organization
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and their status is changed by the IA.
Whenever an agent wants to create a commitment, it asks the IA to do
so and the IA will add this commitment in the commitment store. A similar
operation is done to cancel a commitment. The IA monitors all the changes
in the environment, veriﬁes whether a committed task has been executed or
not and establishes whether the commitment has been fulﬁlled or not. For
example, the IA detects the commitments violated because their deadline has
passed. This agent constantly monitors the existing commitments, modiﬁes
their status and takes the appropriate measures, such as applying sanctions.
The IA is also able to answer the query of an agent that wants to know the
existing commitments or policies it has or others have. Privacy policies can
be easily placed in the IA to give access to agents only to the commitments
that concern them directly, i.e., to give agents information about their roles
and not the roles of other agents.
When an agent enters such an organization, it interacts with the agent
representing the organization and might decide to play a role. It thus asks the
IA to create the appropriate role commitment, which in turn will activate all
the commitments and policies associated with this role. The agent will then
play its role, i.e., it will fulﬁll its commitments and policies. When, for various
reasons, the agent no longer plays its role, the organizational agent cancels
the role commitment of the agent. This is possible because this organizational
agent is the creditor of the role commitment representing the role played by
the agent.
The main tasks of the Institutional Agent are to manage the commitment
store by creating, deleting and modifying the status of the commitments and
to apply sanctions when needed. By using the cascade-commitments model,
this agent applies easily the sanctions: the social policies describing what an
agent should do when it violates a commitment are already present, as they
are part of the role speciﬁcations. When a commitment is violated, all that
the IA has to do is to activate the appropriate policies, thus ensuring the
agent will be committed to pay the sanction. We will see an example of this
mechanism in the following section.
5 Case study
We validate our model by using it in a case study that shows how to specify
using social commitments the expected behaviour of role-playing agents. The
scenario we use as our case study consists of an electronic market in which
contracts are formed between executor and contractor agents. These agents
do not negotiate contracts directly, but by using a broker agent. When asked
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by an executor, a broker negotiates with several constructors a job to be done
by the executor. When an executor does the job, i.e., fulﬁlls the contract
with a contractor, it is payed by the contractor. All the agents know how
to execute tasks like pay(sum) (an agent pays a sum of money to another
agent), job (an agent executes a job) or neg(x,y,job) (an agent negotiates a
contract for a job with another agent. These tasks are TAEMS-like, i.e., they
might have subtasks, they have associated durations, deadlines or rewards.
The negotiation task is a complex task that can be decomposed in several
subtasks like choose negotiation partners and protocols, perform negotiation,
etc. For simplicity, we do not provide details here on how it is executed, but we
consider it as an unitary task. The names of these tasks are also represented
as predicates.
The organizational structure describing the market in our scenario consists
of several roles: RBroker, RExec and RContr. In the following examples
we will consider that these roles are played respectively by a broker agent
(BA), an executor agent (EA) and a contractor agent (CA). Additionally,
the organization is represented by a market agent (MA) that also acts as an
institutional agent, as we will see in the following. Several norms are used to
describe what the agents playing these roles may and should do. For example,
a CA is obliged to negotiate, a BA is obliged to negotiate on behalf of a EA
whenever the latter requests it, etc. The MA also plays the intermediary for
contract payments. When a contract is formed by a CA, this agent is obliged
to pay the MA the value of the contracted job. If the contract is fulﬁlled by
an EA, then the MA pays the agent using the money from the CA. An EA
is obliged to fulﬁll its contracts. With one exception, the above mentioned
obligations have as penalty the exclusion from the organization. If the MA
(acting as an institutional agent) detects that one of these obligations has
not been fulﬁlled, it takes the appropriate measures to ensure that the agent
no longers plays its role. The only obligation with a diﬀerent penalty is the
obligation of an EA to fulﬁll its contracts. An agent violating this obligation
is punished to pay the MA the value of the job it failed to execute.
This scenario is more complex and contains more normative elements than
the ones mentioned above. Due to the lack of space, we will illustrate how
our model allows one to express only some of the above constraints imposed
to roles. For example, the contract for a job between an EA and a CA is
naturally represented as a social commitment:
SComm(EA,CA,MA, job, active, job.deadline)
In this particular case, the social commitment has the same deadline as
its object, although this is not mandatory in our model. An agent playing a
RContr role, e.g., CA, is obliged to pay the MA the value of a contract when
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such contract has been formed. As it is not always obliged to pay, but only
when a given condition holds, we represent this as a social policy expressing
when such an agent should commit to pay:
SPolicy(CA,MA,MA,∀EA:RExec : create(EA,sc(EA,CA, job)) ⇒
create(CA, sc(CA,MA, pay(job.value))), active, CA:RContr)
This role obligation policy states that, as long as an agent plays a role
RContr, it is committed towards the organization to commit itself to pay the
organizational agent the value of a job, whenever such a job is contracted.
This representation allows us to capture the conceptual diﬀerence between
the violation of the commitment to pay (e.g., an agent that does not pay its
taxes) and the violation of the policy to commit to pay (e.g., an agent that
does not intend to pay its taxes). Another obligation of an agent playing
the RContr role is to negotiate. This obligation is always active, not only in
special situations. This is why we interpret it as a goal of the role and we
represent it using a role goal commitment:
SComm(CA,MA,MA,neg(CA,EA, job), active, CA:RContr)
As long as an agent plays this role, it is obliged to negotiate. The ne-
gotiation task in this case is not instantiated, i.e., the agent has autonomy
to perform the negotiation task however it wants. Things are diﬀerent for
an agent playing the RBroker role: it is obliged to negotiate on behalf of
an agent playing the RExec role whenever this one requests it. In this case,
the negotiation task delegated by an EA to a BA is partially instantiated, by
specifying the characteristics of the job to be negotiated or a minimum value
for the contract. As BA is obliged to adopt this task whenever EA delegates
it, we say that EA has authority over BA for negotiation tasks:
SPolicy(BA,MA,MA,∀EA:RExec: request(EA,BA, sc(BA,MA,neg(BA,CA, job))) ⇒
create(BA,sc(BA,MA,neg(BA,CA, job))), active,BA:RBroker)
This role authority policy states that, as long as an agent plays the role
RBroker, whenever an agent playing the role RExec asks it to negotiate on its
behalf, the ﬁrst agent commits to negotiate. Again, this allows us to capture
the diﬀerence between violating the commitment (failing to negotiate) and
violating the policy (disobeying the hierarchy).
Let us now consider the violation of norms and its representation using
our model. As we mentioned before, an EA violating a contract with a CA
is punished to pay to the market the value of the contracted job. In order to
ensure this is possible, a special obligation for the RExec role is introduced:
to obey all requests to pay coming from the market. We represent this using
a role authority policy:
SPolicy(BA,MA,MA,∀sum: request(MA,EA, sc(EA,MA, pay(sum))) ⇒
create(EA,sc(EA,MA, pay(sum))), active, EA:RExec)
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In other words, whenever the market agent asks an executor agent to pay,
the executor agent commits to pay. Of course, an agent can disobey either the
policy (refuses to obey the request) or the commitment (refuses to perform
the task to pay). As mentioned before, the violation of a social policy or
a social commitment towards the market is punished by the MA with the
exclusion from the system, while the violation of a contract with a payment.
We represent this by saying that a market agent (an agent playing a role
RMarket) is committed towards the market (itself) to punish norm violation:
SPolicy(MA,MA,MA,∀EA:RExec ∀CA:RContr : SComm(EA,CA,MA, job,violated, cond) ⇒
request(MA,EA, sc(EA,MA, pay(job.value))), active,MA:RMarket)
SPolicy(MA,MA,MA,∀x : R∀obj ∈ T : SComm(x,MA,MA, obj,violated, cond) ⇒
cancel(MA,RoleComm(x,MA,R, active, true)), active,MA:RMarket)
In the above, R stands for any role. A policy similar to the last one is
used to exclude from the system agents that violate social policies (not only
commitments) towards the market. We presented in this paper a simpliﬁed
version of our case study, from which we mentioned and represented using so-
cial commitments only some of the constraints imposed to roles. A multi-agent
system that follows this scenario and in which the organizational structure is
represented using social commitments is under currently under implementa-
tion. As we mentioned in the previous section, an institutional agent manages
a commitment store that contains all existing commitments and applies sanc-
tions as described above. Because the social commitments and policies are
represented as predicates, the commitment store is implemented as a Prolog
database. The agents are implemented in Java and they use a Java-Prolog
interface in order to access their commitments and reason about them.
6 Related work
Due to space reasons, among the existing approaches on role deﬁnition, we
cite here only two. Boella and van der Torre [1] deﬁne roles using norms and
the BDI model. We thus talk about the beliefs or the desires of a role, i.e.,
the beliefs and the desires that an agent playing the role must have. Dastani
et al. [6] use a similar model and deﬁne a role in terms of the goals it must
achieve and the permissions it has to do so. They also consider the problem
of an agent having to conciliate its own goals with the ones of its role. One
of the drawbacks of these two approaches is that they make assumptions on
the agent’s internal model. For example, it is diﬃcult for a non-BDI agent to
understand what it means that the role it plays has an associated desire.
Specifying the expected behaviour of an agent playing a role is somehow
diﬃcult because norms are context-dependent. Instead of listing from the
beginning the goals a role must achieve, one should specify to an agent what
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are its obligations and in which context are they active. A way to specify when
a role is obliged to do something is via authority relationships: whenever the
superior role delegates a task, the inferior role adopts it.
We believe that social commitments and policies are a suited tool to ad-
dress these issues and that one can use them to deﬁne the constraints imposed
to an agent playing a role in an agent organization. We are not the ﬁrst to
hold this belief: in this paper we extend the work of Singh [19] by introduc-
ing the permissions and prohibitions associated with a role and by identifying
diﬀerent types of social policies that target a role. An attempt to a common
formalization of roles, commitments and obligations is presented in [11]. How-
ever, this attempt takes into considerations only the obligations an agent has
because it is committed towards another, and not the organizational obliga-
tions imposed to roles. An approach similar to ours is presented in [18], where
the authors draw from the role-based access community and deﬁne roles and
role policies in multi-agent systems. For the same objective, to provide a coor-
dination framework for agents in organizations, we use a diﬀerent model that
has the advantage of using the same concept to describe agent interaction in
both institutional and non-institutional contexts.
This social commitments’ characteristic, of being suitable for both inter-
action and organization modelling, biased us towards using them and not a
similar, yet not identical concept, that of contract. Several authors (e.g., [2] or
[8]) have used the contracts to deﬁne agent organizations. While from a formal
point of view these two concepts are similar, they have conceptually diﬀerent
semantics. Contracts are an institutional notion, while social commitments
are not intrinsequally institutional. They have a broader meaning and use,
e.g., social commitments have been used to deﬁne agent communications. We
believe that by using social commitments we move one step closer to a model
of agent coordination using both agent interactions and agent organizations.
7 Conclusions
Social commitments have already been used to represent agent interactions
and communications. One of their main advantages is that by using social
commitments, one does not make any assumptions on the agents’ internal
model. One of the aspects less present in related work on commitment-based
agent interactions is the organizational context of interactions. Agents act
on the environment and interact with other agents while being part of an
organization, i.e., while playing one or several roles in an organization. In an
organizational context, the agents’ behaviour is constrained by the permissions
and obligations they receive from the organization. Our objective is to obtain
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a uniﬁed model of reasoning on agent interactions in both organizational and
non-organizational contexts. Towards this aim, in this paper we proposed a
deﬁnition of roles and organizational structures based on social commitments.
In this paper we did not propose a new deﬁnition of social commitments,
but we based our approach on several existing models. We tailored these
models to our needs by representing commitments’ objects as TAEMS-like
tasks and by regrouping diﬀerent concepts present in related commitment
deﬁnitions into one - the Institutional Agent. We analyzed its characteristics
and we discussed several possibilities of designing such an agent.
An organizational structure has been deﬁned in this paper as a collection
of roles, where a role is considered to be the subject of diﬀerent types of social
commitments and policies. By using the same concept, social commitments,
we deﬁned what it means for an agent to play a role in an organization. As
future work, we intend to merge this work with existing works concerning
commitment-based agent interactions to thus obtain a uniﬁed model of agent
coordination in both organizational and non-organizational contexts. We dis-
cussed in this paper the utility of such a model for both an agent and the
system. Before entering a system or joining an organization, an agent can
represent the constraints that will be imposed on its behaviour using this
model. Because this model makes explicit the violation of these constraints,
the system can easily identify rebellious agents and take appropriate measures.
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